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I. INTRODUCTION
A grand jury indicted Daniel Lowell Coler on three counts of
rape and one count of sexual battery of his daughter, Mary Coler.'
Testimony at the trial revealed that:
[T]he first time Defendant raped his daughter Mary was after
the mother moved out and before Christmas, 1972. The daugh-
ter was then seven years old. He forced her to perform fellatio
on him, after which he forced her to submit to sexual inter-
course. This occured approximately every week or every other
week thereafter . . . . At the trial [a] Dr. Benrubi testified that,
upon his examination of Mary, he discovered a complete ab-
sence of the posterior hymenal ring and a great deal of scarring
on the posterior fourchette, the aspect of the entrance of the
vagina immediately next to the hymenal ring. This was not a
congenital anomoly. Dr. Benrubi stated that, in his opinion, this
condition was caused by the repeated penetration of the vagina
at an early age by some object equal or greater than the diame-
1. Coler v. State, 418 So. 2d 238 (Fla. 1982).
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ter of the vaginal entrance at a time when the vagina was not
ready to receive such object . . . . Dr. Benrubi testified that he
had never before seen as much scarring as he did on the exami-
nation of this child.'
The defendant's three children testified at the trial that "[the
defendant] made the children eat a cucumber which, just prior
thereto, he had inserted into [Mary]'s rectum."' Mary and one of
the defendant's sons further testified that their father ordered the
son to have sexual intercourse with his sister, threatening to ampu-
tate his penis with a pair of scissors if he refused.
Outraged, the trial court sentenced Coler to death. The Su-
preme Court of Florida vacated the death sentences and ordered a
new trial. The supreme court held inadmissible and prejudicial all
testimony not relating to the four specific incidents charged in the
indictment.7
The typically loathsome nature of sexual offenses has led
many outraged courtse to admit evidence of the defendant's prior
deviant sexual behavior in spite of the "other crimes evidence
rule," which disallows evidence of other crimes of the defendant
when offered to prove that the defendant committed the charged
act.*
Outrage, however, is not a sound basis for carving an excep-
tion to a rule which has as its theoretical underpinning a notion
basic to our criminal justice system: the presumed innocence of
the defendant.10 On the other hand, courts have endeavored to
2. Id. at 242-44 (Alderman, J., dissenting).
3. Id. at 239.
4. Id. at 243.
5. Id. at 238.
6. The court held that the death sentence was "grossly disproportionate and excessive
punishment for the crime of sexual assault and therefore forbidden by the eighth amend-
ment as cruel unusual punishment." Id.
7. Id. at 239.
8. For a discussion of several of these jurisdictions, see infra text accompanying notes
49-109.
9. For codified rules, see, e.g., FED. R. EwD. 404(b); Omio Rav. CoDs ANN. § 2945.59
(Page 1981); S.D. CODiPEDo LAWS ANN. § 19-12-5 (1979). For jurisdictions maintaining a com-
mon law rule, see, e.g., State v. Ibraimov, 187 Conn. 348, 352, 446 A.2d 382, 384 (1982); State
v. Wrenn, 99 Idaho 506, 510, 584 P.2d 1231, 1235 (1978); Cravens v. State, 663 S.W.2d 668,
670 (TeL Ct. App. 1983).
10. See United States v. Foskey, 636 F.2d 517, 523 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (" 'concomitant to
the presumption of innocence,"' is that "(ult is fundamental to American jurisprudence that
'a defendant must be tried for what he did, not for who he is' "); Slough & Knightly, Other
Vices, Other Crimes, 40 IowA L. Rzv. 325, 325 (1956).
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compensate for the inherent uniqueness" of sexual offenses by
carving exceptions to the other crimes rule. 2 This article surveys
the various theoretical explanations for the exceptions to the other
crimes rule in the area of sexual crimes and concludes that other
sexual offense evidence may be introduced, under limited circum-
stances, against an alleged sexual offender without violating the
rule barring evidence of other crimes to prove propensity.
II. THE RULE BARRING PROPENSITY EVIDENCE (THE OTHER
CRIMES EVIDENCE RULE)
Evidence of other acts by a person, whether criminal or not,"1
are generally inadmissible to prove that the person acted in con-
formity with such other acts. In other words, evidence of a person's
prior acts is inadmissible to prove that the person has a propensity
to commit such acts." Under the Federal Rules of Evidence and
many codified state versions' s of the other crimes rule, however,
evidence of prior acts is admissible when relevant for any purpose
other than propensity."' Conceptually, the rule barring propensity
11. See Liles & Bulkley, Prior Sexual Acts of the Defendant as Evidence in Prosecu-
tions for Child Sexual Abuse, in CILD SEXUAL ABUSE AND THE LAW 199, 199 (J. Bulkley ed.
1984) ("[T]hese offenses frequently leave no physical evidence. Furthermore, they usually
occur in a clandestine manner .....
12. Id.
13. See, e.g., FED. R. EvID. 404(b) ("other crimes, wrongs, or acts"); M. GRAHAM, Evi-
DENCE-TEXT, RULES, ILLUSTRATIONS AND PROBLEMS 509 (1983).
14. Michelson v. United States, 335 United States 469 (1948). This rule can be traced
to the 1850's. Stone, Rule of Exclusion of Similar Fact Evidence: America, 51 HARv. L REV.
988, 989 (1938) ("[In the beginning the law said: 'Let no similar facts be admitted,' and no
similar facts were admitted.").
Many jurisdictions have codified the rule. See, e.g., S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 19-12-5
(1979):
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character
of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith. It may, how-
ever, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, in-
tent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.
Id. See also FED. R. EvID. 404(b) (same).
15. For a list of states adopting the Federal Rules of Evidence in various forms, see 1 J.
WEINSTEIN, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE, STATE ADAPTATIONS OF THE FEDERAL RULzs OF EVIDENCE
(1985).
16. See M. GRAHAM, supra note 13, at 508.
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evidence looks like this:1 7
Inference No. 1 Inference No. 2
THE ITEM' o EVIDENCE THE INTERMEDIATE INPERENCE THE ULTIMATE INPERENCE
The Prior Act Defendant's Subjective Action Consistent with
Character Defendant's Character
Evidence of prior acts is inadmissable only where both Inference No. 1 and Inference No. 2
exist.
Inference No. 1 provides that because the defendant commit-
ted the prior act, the defendant is the type of person that commits
such acts. The danger of this inference lies in its prejudicial na-
ture. It draws the jury's attention to the type of person the defen-
dant is, thus tempting the jury to convict the defendant because he
is a bad man, rather than because they believe the defendant is
guilty of the charged crime."
Inference No. 2 provides that because the defendant has a bad
character, the defendant must have committed the crime. The
danger of Inference No. 2 lies in the jury's potential to overesti-
mate the probative value of the prior acts evidence.1 ' Studies sug-
gest that jurors are greatly influenced by evidence of a person's
prior criminal behavior.20 The defendant's prior behavior, however,
is only slightly related to his conduct on a particular occasion.' 1
The rule barring propensity evidence is designed to avoid the
two dangers discussed above. The rule applies, however, only when
the intermediate inference-that the defendant is a bad man-
is coupled with the ultimate inference-that the defendant com-
mitted the crime charged. The rule barring propensity evidence is
inapplicable where the ultimate inference arises from a different
intermediate inference. When prior acts are admitted to prove dis-
puted issues in the case,"2 such as the identity of the defendant,
the absence of mistake or accident, or the defendant's intent, no
violation of the other crimes evidence rule exists.'s
Wigmore, in what was later called the "exclusionary" rule,u
17. E. IuwINKRIJUmD, UNCHARGED MISCONDUCT EVIDENCE 2.18, at 2-48 (1984).
18. Id. at 2.49.
19. Id.
20. See, e.g., Lawson, Credibility and Character: A Different Look at an Interminable
Problem, 50 NoTm DAMz LAw. 75, 776 (1975).
21. K IMmwmmitD, supra note 17, § 2.18, at 2-49 to -50.
22. For cases and authorities discussing the issues for which other crimes evidence may
be admissible, see K! GRAHAM, supra note 13, at 508-12.
23. Id. at 508.




determined that other crimes evidence was not admissible unless
relevant to prove specific exceptions, such as design, plan, motive,
identity or intent.25 Professor Stone, in a frequently cited article,
argued against such a "spurious" articulation of the rule because it
fostered pigeonholeing.26 Stone argued for the "English rule," later
called the "inclusionary" rule, 7 which allowed for the admissibility
of all relevant evidence except that which was relevant only to
show a general disposition to commit the charged crime. 8
The "spurious" nature of Wigmore's articulation of the rule is
most clearly manifested in the area of evidence of other sexual of-
fenses of a defendant.2' Many courts, when confronted with the
question of the admissibility of a defendant's other sexual offenses,
have allowed such evidence, using Wigmore's "magic shibbo-
leths, '30 rather than making individualized determinations of the
relevancy of the other crimes evidence.31 In order to rationalize the
admission of these prior acts, courts often designate an exception
for which the prior acts are relevant, such as to prove a common
scheme or plan, when in fact, no such issue exists.33
25. J. WIGMORE, CODE OF EVIDENCE 81 (3d ed. 1942).
26. See Stone, supra note 14.
27. C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra note 24, § 5239, at 432.
28. Stone, supra note 14, at 1004.
29. Gregg, Other Acts of Sexual Misbehavior and Perversion as Evidence in Prosecu-
tions for Sexual Offenses, 6 ARMz. L. REV. 212, 212-13 (1965).
30. Id.
31. In other words, courts have failed to determine whether the evidence is relevant to
prove the propensity of the defendant to commit the crime or whether it is relevant to prove
a disputed issue in the case. Id.; Note, Evidence of Similar Transactions in Sex Crime
Prosecutions-A New Trend Toward Liberal Admissibility, 40 MINN. L. REV. 694. 698
(1956) ("Rationalizing the admission of independent transactions under standard or other
exceptions may merely be a more subtle method of contraverting the rule.").
32. In order for other crimes evidence to be relevant to a plan or common scheme of the
defendant, the identity of the defendant must be at issue and there must be a "true plan."
See E. IMWINKELRIED, supra note 17, § 3.20, at 3-50. A "true plan" refers to the notion that
"the prosecutor may prove any uncharged crime by the defendant which shows that the
defendant in fact and in mind formed a plan including the charged and uncharged crimes as
stages in the plan's execution." Id. § 3.21, at 3-53. The following are examples of cases
misapplying the plan or common scheme rationale. Daly v. State, 99 Nev. 564, 567, 665 P.2d
798, 801 (1983) (The court held evidence of uncharged sexual offenses of the defendant
admissible under the common scheme or plan rationale where the defendant's identity was
not at issue and where the court failed to show the existence of a true plan.); State v. Sills,
- N.C..... - 317 S.E.2d 379, 384 (1984) (In a prosecution for first degree sexual
offenses against a child, the court held admissible evidence of prior sexual offenses of the
defendant where there existed no issue of identity or a true plan.); Hancock v. State, 664
P.2d 1039, 1041 (Okla. Crim. App. 1983) (The court held testimony regarding prior sexual
activity of defendant admissible under the identity or common scheme or plan exceptions
even though the prosecution did not allege that the other crimes and the charged crime were
part of a larger plan and even though the defendant did not dispute his identity.).
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Additionally, several courts have claimed that "lewd disposi-
tion" and "depraved sexual instinct" are legitimate purposes for
allowing evidence of prior acts. 3 On the other hand, other courts
recognize evidence of other crimes, proferred to show the defen-
dant's lewd disposition and other similar theories, for what it
is-propensity evidence. These courts have expressly carved an ex-
ception to the rule barring propensity evidence in the area of sex-
ual offenses.
34
Admitting evidence of prior sexual acts of the defendant for a
purpose which is not at issue in the case, or for the purpose of
showing lewd disposition or other similar theories, is inconsistent
with the rule barring propensity evidence because the prior acts
are admitted, in fact, for the purpose which the rule prohibits-to
show the propensities of the defendant to commit the crime
charged.36 This inherent inconsistency has caused much confusion
For a more detailed discussion of the pervasive misapplication of the plan or common
scheme rationale, see Imwinkelried, The Plan Theory for Admitting Evidence of the Defen-
dant's Uncharged Crimes: A Microcosm of the Flaws in the Uncharged Misconduct Doc-
trine, 50 Mo. L Rzv. 1 (1985); Comment, Admissibility of Evidence Under Indiana's "Com-
mon Scheme or Plan Exception," 53 IND. LJ. 805 (1978); Comment, Defining Standards for
Determining the Admissibility of Evidence of Other Sex Offenses, 25 UCLA L. REv. 261,
280-84 (1977); Note, Admissibility of Similar Crimes, 18 BROOKLYN L. REv. 80 (1952).
33. See, e.g., Collins v. State, 669 S.W.2d 505, 507 (Ark. Ct. App. 1984) ("{Wjhere the
charge involves unnatural sexual acts proof of prior similar offenses... shows not that the
accused is a criminal but that he has a 'depraved sexual instinct'... .") (quoting Alford v.
State, 223 Ark. 330, 335, 266 S.W.2d 804, 807 (1954)); Brooks v. State, 242 So. 2d 865, 869
(Miss. 1971) ("The 'acid test is [the uncharged crimes] logical relevancy to the particular
excepted purpose or purposes' for which the evidence of prior offenses is sought to be intro-
duced, 'and the considerations justifying the reception of evidence of other similar crimes
has been held by some courts to be peculiarly applicable in prosecutions for sexual of-
fenses.' ") (quoting 29 Ab. Jun. 2d Evidence § 321 (1967)). See Note, supra note 31, at 698.
34. See, e.g., Johnson v. State, - Ind. -_ 472 N.E.2d 892, 911 (1985)
("Other similar acts of sodomy, in this case anal intercourse, would be admissible under the
depraved sexual instinct exception."); State v. Ferguson, 100 Wash. 2d 131,133-34, 667 P.2d
68, 70 (1983) ("This court has often invoked an exception in similar cases to permit evi-
dence of collateral sexual misconduct when it shows a lustful disposition directed toward the
offended female.").
35. See, e.g., E. IMWINicLRInD, supra note 17, § 4.11, at 4-29 ("In sex offense cases,
many jurisdictions have carved out a notable exception to that general prohibition; the
courts allow the prosecutor to offer evidence of the defendant's disposition for various types
of sexual conduct.") (footnote omitted); Note, Evidence-The Emotional Propensity Ex-
ception, 1978 ARx ST. LJ. 163, 155 ("Under (the sexual crime] exception, evidence of simi-
lar acts by the defendant is admissible to show the defendant's disposition to commit the
sex crime charged.") (footnote omitted); Note, supra note 31, at 695:
An inexorable corollary of the inadmissibility rule is that no evidence may be
admitted to show a propensity on the part of the accused to perpetrate crimes in
general or crimes of the type charged, nor to illustrate wickedness or depravity.
Recently, however, courts have freely admitted evidence for precisely these pur-
poses in sexual offense cases.
[Vol. 40:217
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in the law regarding the admissibility of prior sexual acts of the
defendant.
36
The confusion and inconsistency may also be the result of the
dichotomous nature of the various articulated rationales which al-
legedly compel the rule barring propensity evidence." On the one
hand, evidence of other crimes is excluded because it is believed to
be "irrelevant to prove the conduct in question." 5 On the other
hand, evidence of other crimes may be excluded "not because it
has no appreciable probative value, but because it has too much."'
Some courts are apparently of the view that if the other crimes
evidence is highly probative, it is therefore admissible. 0 Other
courts apparently admit other crimes evidence only if it fits within
one of the traditional exceptions, regardless of relevancy."
Id.
36. See infra text accompanying notes 49-109.
37. Cf. Trautman, Logical or Legal Relevancy-A Conflict in Theory, 5 VAND. L. Rav.
385 (1952):
In no area of circumstantial evidence is it so necessary as [in the area of evi-
dence of other crimes] to have at hand a set of basic principles providing a ra-
tional method for determining the problem of admissibility; and probably in no
area of judicial administration is there greater uncertainity, due in part to a lack
of analysis with respect to logical relevancy, and in part to the substantial confu-
sion in the cases concerning the policies of exclusion.
Id. at 403.
38. 22 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra note 24, § 5236, at 436. "As Wigmore says, it has
long been accepted in our law ... [t]hat 'the doing of one act is in itself no evidence that
the same or a like act was again done by the same person'. . . . The reason for this is that
our knowledge of the causes of human conduct is too weak to provide any major premise
that will support the desired inference." Id. (footnotes omitted). See also Slough &
Knightly, supra note 10, at 333 ("To state that a man is disposed to commit murder, or
disposed to commit larceny, therefore he most likely has committed murder or larceny on
this occasion is tantamount to a rejection of all common sense rules of relevancy.").
39. 1 J. WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALs
AT COMMON LAW § 194, at 646 (3d ed. 1940).
40. See, e.g., State v. Kristich, 226 Or. 240, 246, 359 P.2d 1106, 1109 (1961) ("In this
case the probative relevance of the [other sexual offense) evidence overbalanced the
prejudice the evidence may have created."). See also 22 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra
note 24, § 5236, at 461 ("[Cjourts will admit other crimes evidence to prove the doing of the
charged act where the evidence is highly probative or the need for such proof is unusually
great. A good example of this is the use of other crimes evidence in sex offenses.") (footnotes
omitted).
41. See, e.g., Lafayette v. State, 694 P.2d 530, 531 (Okla. Crim. App. 1985) (The court
held the other sexual offense evidence "support[edi the state's burden of proof by tending
to establish intent and opportunity" where intent and opportunity were not disputed is-
sues.). See also Imwinkelried, supra note 32, at 13 ("In many [spurious plan] cases, the
evidence is logically irrelevant on that theory because the crimes were not committed with a
unique modus operandi .... In other cases, the evidence is legally irrelevant because the
issue of the defendant's identity was not in dispute.") (footnotes omitted); Slough &
Knightly, supra note 10, at 326 ("This excessive rash of exceptions [regarding jurisdictions
1985)
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A penetrating look at the other crimes rule reveals the follow-
ing. Other crimes evidence may or may not be probative of the
charged crime, or, it may be somewhere between highly probative
and slightly probative of the charged crime. The degree of proba-
tive value depends on many factors, such as the similarity of the
prior crimes to the charged crime, as well as the nature of the
crime itself."' The rule barring propensity evidence, however, is
premised on notions other than relevancy. Specifically, the rule
guards against two concerns: "(1) that the jury may convict a 'bad
man' who deserves to be punished-not because he is guilty of the
charged crime but because of his prior or subsequent misdeeds,
and (2) that the jury will infer that because the accused committed
other crimes, he probably committed the crime charged."4  The
notion of relevancy comes into play only when the proferred other
crimes evidence is relevant to a purpose other than to prove pro-
pensity.4 4 Thus, although the evidence may in fact be probative of
propensity, the other crimes evidence is not excluded where its in-
troduction proves a material issue in the case."
Some courts that have adopted an exception to the rule bar-
ring propensity evidence have based the exception on the unique
nature of sexual crimes. Because in most sexual crimes "the critical
issue will be the credibility of the prosecuting witness vis-h-vis that
of the accused,"' 6 the corroborating nature of the other crimes evi-
dence makes introduction of the proffered evidence especially com-
pelling.4 The tension between the necessity of the other crimes
adopting the exclusionary rule] may have stylized certain principles affecting the operation
of the general rule, but rigid formulae have all but jettisoned any sane attempt at rationali-
zation of individual fact situations."); supra notes 29.32 and accompanying text.
42. Notable is the fact that with respect to abherrant sexual behavior, current data
suggests that other sexual crimes of the defendant are not probative of the charged crime
because of the low recidivism rate among persons engaging in abherrant forms of sexual
behavior. See, e.g., E. IUWINKmLRM, supra note 17, § 4.16 at 4-38; Gregg, supra note 29, at
233; Slough, Relevancy Unraveled, 6 KAN. L. Rzv. 38, 51 (1957).
43. M. GRAHAM, supra note 13, at 508. (quoting United States v. Phillips, 599 F.2d 134,
136 (6th Cir. 1979)); see Comment, Other Crimes Evidence at Trial: Of Balancing and
Other Matters, 70 YAIz LJ. 763, 763-64 (1961).
44. M. GRAHAM, supra note 13, at 508.
45. See, e.g., William v. State, 110 So. 2d 654, 659 (Fla. 1959); MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 768.27 (West 1982). Cf. Slough & Knightly, supra note 10, at 325 ("It is one thing to rule
out evidence of crime which reflects only a vague propensity, it is another thing to rule out
evidence of other crimes relevant to the facts in issue.").
Note, however, that even if the other crimes evidence is relevant to a material issue in
the case, it may still be subject to exclusion under FED. R Evm. 403.
46. Comment, supra note 32, at 263; Liles & Bulkley, supra note 11, at 199.
47. People v. Covert, 249 Cal. App. 2d 81, 88, 57 Cal. Rptr. 220, 224; Comment, supra
note 82, at 263. See also Gregg, supra note 29, at 218.
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evidence, and the rule which prohibits such evidence, has contrib-
uted to the confusion and inconsistency among the courts with re-
spect to the admissibility of other sexual offense evidence.' 8 What
follows is an analysis of representative jurisdictions that have at-
tempted, but failed, to establish an exception in sexual offense
cases to the rule barring propensity evidence that is theoretically
sound and consistently applied.
III. REPRESENTATIVE JURISDICTIONS
A. California
California is perhaps the most interesting of the various juris-
dictions that have explicitly recognized an exception to the other
crimes rule where the prosecutor proffers evidence of uncharged
sexual offenses in a sexual crime case. California was one of the
first states to expressly maintain such an exception.49 Initially, Cal-
ifornia limited the exception by allowing only evidence of prior
sexual offenses against the victim.50 Some California courts subse-
quently extended the exception to allow evidence of prior sexual
offenses against third parties.51 Eventually, three lines of case law
developed: one which allowed evidence 'of prior sexual crimes
under the "common scheme or plan" rubric,5' another which al-
48. Cf. 22 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra note 24, § 5236, at 462. ("The need for [other
sexual offense] evidence has led some courts to rely on debateable assumptions .... ").
49. See, e.g., People v. Anthony, 185 Cal. 152, 196 P. 47 (1921); People v. Sylvia, 54 Cal.
2d 115, 351 P. 2d, 781, 4 Cal. Rptr. 509 (Ct. App. 1960). See Notes and Recent Decisions, 39
CALIF. L. REV. 584 (1951); Note, supra note 31.
50. Anthony, 185 Cal. at 157, 196 P. at 49 ("Our rule confining the testimony to the
crime charged in the information has only been relaxed so far as to permit testimony of
similar conduct with the complaining witness."). One author articulated the justifications
for California's departure as follows:
(1) the alarmed and horrified attitude of the public in such cases; (2) the recog-
nition of valid medical grounds to differentiate sex crimes from other offenses;
(3) the strong probability that defendant will anticipate use of evidence of simi-
lar acts upon the complaining witness, and will not be prejudiced by surprise; (4)
the claim that this evidence shows a passion towards one person and hence tends
to prove intentional commission of the alleged act.
Notes and Recent Decisions, supra note 49, at 585 (footnote omitted).
51. See, e.g., People v. Cox, 102 Cal. App. 2d 285, 227 P.2d 290 (Ct. App. 1951); People
v. Boyd, 95 Cal. App. 2d 831, 213 P.2d 724 (Ct. App. 1950); People v. Herman, 97 Cal. App.
2d 272, 217 P.2d 440 (Ct. App. 1950). But see People v. Westek, 31 Cal. 2d 469, 190 P.2d 9
(1948). For a discussion of these cases, see Notes and Recent Decisions, supra note 49, at
584.
52. See, e.g., People v. Ing, 65 Cal. 2d 603, 422 P.2d 590, 55 Cal. Rptr. 902 (1967). See
also People v. Covert, 249 Cal. App. 2d 81, 57 Cal. Rptr. 220 (Ct. App. 1967) (discussion of
California cases espousing the "common scheme or plan" theory), disapproved on other
grounds, People v. Thomas, 20 Cal. 3d 457, 573 P.2d 433, 143 Cal. Rptr. 215 (1978). In
1985]
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lowed evidence of prior sexual crimes to show the "lewd disposi-
tion" of the defendant," and finally, a line of cases that espoused
the "corroboration" rationale."4
Recently, however, California courts have severely narrowed or
rejected these earlier decisions. With respect to the corroboration
theory, the Supreme Court of California, in People v. Stanley,"
held that the "prosecuting witness cannot give testimony regarding
defendant's prior offenses with that witness, for such evidence
'add[ed] nothing to the prosecution's case . . . [and] involve[d] a
substantial danger of prejudice to defendant.' " In People v.
Thomas," the defendant was convicted of committing lewd and
lascivious acts on the body of his step-daughter, a child under the
age of fourteen. On appeal to the supreme court, the prosecution
argued that the testimony of defendant's natural child, concerning
the defendant's prior sexual acts against her, was admissible to
corroborate the testimony of the defendant's step-daughter. 8
Thomas disapproved of prior case law which allowed "evidence of
all prior offenses with persons other than the prosecuting witness
if the sole asserted purpose for the admission of such evidence was
discussing the "common scheme or plan" theory, the Covert court noted:
There are sound reasons of policy and logic for viewing common scheme or plan
as the occasion for admissibility in most of these sex cases. The offense almost
always occurs in private. The only direct witnesses are the prosecuting witness
and the defendant. Although circumstantial evidence supplies occasional corrob-
oration, conviction usually hinges upon the credibility of the prosecuting wit-
ness. In this kind of case beyond any other, the defendant's plea of innocence
challenges the credibility of the alleged victim. The challenge inheres in the very
nature of the contest and usually demands an answer long before the prosecu-
tion's turn for rebuttal.
249 Cal. App. 2d at 88, 57 Cal. Rptr. at 224. For a discussion of the "common scheme or
plan" theory in sex crime cases, see supra note 32.
53. See, eg., People v. Sylvia, 54 Cal. 2d 115, 351 P.2d 781, 4 Cal. Rptr. 509 (1960). For
a discussion of the lewd disposition theory, see supra notes 33-36 and accompanying text.
54. See, eg., People v. Creighton. 57 Cal. App. 3d 314, 129 Cal. Rptr. 249 (CL App.
1976) disapproved, People v. Thomas, 20 Cal. 3d 457, 573 P.2d 433, 143 Cal. Rptr. 215
(1978); People v. Kaze, 47 Cal. App. 3d 593, 121 Cal. Rptr. 221 (Ct. App. 1975), disap-
proved, People v. Thomas, 20 Cal. 3d 457, 573 P.2d 433, 143 Cal. Rptr. 215 (1978); People v.
Covert, 249 Cal. App. 2d 81, 57 Cal. Rptr. 220. The corroboration rationale refers to the
notion that other crimes evidence is especially compelling in the area of sexual offenses
because of the absence of evidence of the crime other than the victim's testimony. See supra
text accompanying notes 46-48.
55. 67 Cal. 2d 812, 433 P.2d 913, 63 Cal. Rptr. 825 (1967).
56. People v. Thomas, 20 Cal. 3d 457, 469, 573 P.2d 433, 439, 143 Cal. Rptr. 215, 221
(1978) (quoting Stanley, 67 Cal. 2d at 819, 433 P.2d at 917, 63 Cal. Rptr. at 829).
57. Id.
58. Id. at 468, 573 P.2d at 438, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 220.
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to corroborate the prosecuting witness."' The Thomas court rea-
soned that such a broad exception, lacking a requirement of re-
moteness or similarity of the prior sexual offenses, would swallow
the rule barring propensity evidence.60 The corroboration theory
was thus narrowed by the court's articulation of a concomitant re-
quirement of non-remoteness and similarity.
If Thomas nibbled at the corroboration theory, then People v.
Tasselle took a bite at both the common scheme or plan rationale
and the lewd disposition theory. 2 The Tassell court noted that
"[aibsent ... a 'grand design,' 8 talk of 'common plan or scheme' is
really nothing but the bestowing of a respectable label on a disrep-
utable basis for admissibility-the defendant's disposition.""" Ap-
parently, the California courts have come full circle from their




Arizona is another jurisdiction which expressly recognizes an
59. Thomas, 20 Cal. 3d at 469, 573 P.2d at 439, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 221.
60. Id.
61. 36 Cal. 3d 77, 679 P.2d 1, 201 Cal. Rptr. 567 (1984).
62. Ironically, Tassel was decided subsequent to the passage of Proposition 8, which
amended California's constitution by enacting the "Right to Truth-in-Evidence" concept.
The "Right to Truth-in-Evidence" provision provides that, subject to a balancing test of
probativeness versus prejudice, the court must admit evidence of prior bad acts that have
any tendency to discredit a witness. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 28(d). Proposition 8, however, may
not be controlling where the defendant does not testify. Furthermore, Proposition 8 was not
controlling in Tassel because the offenses predated the effective date of Proposition 8. Peo-
ple v. Tassell, 36 Cal. 3d 77, 82 n.1, 201 Cal. Rptr. 567, 569 n.1, 679 P.2d 1, 3 n.1 (1984). For
a discussion of Proposition 8, see Mendez, California's New Law on Character Evidence:
Evidence Code Section 352 and the Impact of Recent Psychological Studies, 31 UCLA L
Rav. 1003 (1984).
63. The Tassell court defined grand design as "a 'single conception or plot' of which the
charged and uncharged crimes are individual manifestations." Id. at 84, 679 P.2d at 5, 201
Cal. Rptr. at 571.
64. Id. (footnote omitted). The court's rejection of the lewd disposition theory is actu-
ally implicit. The Supreme Court of California, throughout the Tassell opinion, evidenced
its distaste for any theory which in fact rested on the use of other offenses to prove disposi-
tion. Additionally, Tassell may have implicitly rejected Thomas, by holding that, with re-
spect to the common scheme or plan theory, where identity is not at issue, the striking
similarity among the prior crimes and the charged crimes is irrelevant. Id. at 89, 679 P.2d at
8, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 574.
65. For a recent case following Tassell, see People v. Gordon, 165 Cal. App. 3d, 839, 212
Cal. Rptr. 174 (Ct. App. 1985) (prior acts of defendant against prosecutrix inadmissible
where neither identity nor intent is at issue). But see People v. Moon, - Cal. App. _
- 212 Cal. Rptr. 101, 105 (Ct. App. 1985) ("Tassell involved the relevance of prior
offenses against other individuals, not against the same victim.")
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exception to the other crimes rule with respect to aberrant sexual
offenses. The Supreme Court of Arizona, in State v. MacFarlin,"
surveyed the development of Arizona's propensity exception,
67
holding in spite of recognition of "sharp criticism"s of such excep-
tion, that where the charge involved "the element of abnormal sex
acts such as sodomy, child molesting, lewd and lascivious [behav-
ior], etc., there is sufficient basis to accept proof of similar acts
near in time to the offense charged as evidence of the accused's
propensity to commit such perverted acts."'' Apparently, in an at-
tempt to allay criticism, the court required nearness in time7° and
similar "abnormal" sex acts.71
In State v. Treadaway," the Supreme Court of Arizona added
a unique twist to its propensity exception. In situations where the
prior crimes sought to be introduced were remote in time, the
court required reliable expert medical testimony that indicated the
prior act "tend[ed] to show a continuing emotional propensity to
commit the act charged." As in McFarlin, the court restricted the
propensity exception in response to criticism. The court acknowl-
edged that because most statistical studies indicated that sexual
offenders have a low rate of recidivism, "prior similar acts may be
less probative for sex crimes than for other crimes, and [thus the
statistical evidence] supported the criticism of this exception."7
The court's requirement of expert medical testimony regarding the
defendant's disposition was apparently an attempt to exclude the
possibility that the prior crimes were irrelevant to the crime
charged.
The Treadway Court's unique attempt at combatting the in-
herent dangers of an exception to the rule barring propensity evi-
dence has been severely limited. The supreme court held it inap-
66. 110 Ariz. 225, 517 P.2d 87 (1973).
67. For a more detailed analysis, see Note, Evidence-The Emotional Propensity Ex-
ception, 1978 Am ST. LJ. 163.
68. McFarlin, 110 Ariz, at 228, 517 P.2d at 90.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 228, 517 P.2d at 90;, Note, supra note 67, at 153.
71. See State v. Corcoran, 119 Ariz. 573, 583 P.2d 229 (1978) (because the prior crime
was similar and near in time, McFarlin, not Treadaway, controlled); State v. Williams, 111
Ariz. 511, 533 P.2d 1146 (1975) (emotional propensity for sexual aberration exception did
not apply to prior bad act of rape which did not entail sodomy, child molestation or lewd
and lascivious behavior). See also State v. Cousin, 136 Ariz. 83, 664, P.2d 233 (Ct. App.
1983); State v. Jerousek, 121 Ariz. 420, 590 P.2d 1366 (1979).
72. 116 Ariz. 163, 568 P.2d 1061 (1977).




plicable to other crimes committed by the defendant against the
same victim. In State v. Garner,75 the Supreme Court of Arizona
upheld the admissibility of evidence of the defendant's prior sexual
acts against his adopted son in a trial concerning child molesta-
tion.7 6 The court determined that the facts were distinguishable
from both McFarlin and Treadway because the defendant's prior
act and the charged act were commited against the same victim."
The Garner court fashioned a sweeping rule: "In a case involving a
sex offense committed against a child, evidence of a prior similar
sex offense committed against the same child is admissible to show
the defendant's lewd disposition or unnatural attitude toward the
particular victim." 7 8 The supreme court's rejection of the require-
ment of expert testimony regarding the defendant's disposition
where the uncharged offenses were against the victim of the
charged offense, and its articulation of a broad exception to the
other crimes evidence rule, was a regression to Arizona's much crit-
icized sexual offense exception.
C. Rhode Island
Rhode Island, another jurisdiction adopting the lewd disposi-
tion theory, has similarly responded to criticism by requiring that
evidence of prior crimes be used "sparingly" and only when "rea-
sonably necessary. 7 9 In State v. Jalette,'0 the Supreme Court of
Rhode Island noted "that the indiscriminate use of 'other crimes'
evidence poses a substantial risk to an accused's right to a fair
trial,""' given the merely average rate of recidivism among sexual
offenders8" and the inflammatory nature of the evidence.'
3
The Jalette court, in fashioning the above-mentioned precon-
ditions to the introduction of other crimes evidence in sexual of-
fense cases, derived its rule from the Supreme Court of California
75. 116 Ariz. 443, 569 P.2d 1341 (1977).
76. Id. at 447, 569 P.2d at 1345.
77. Id. Garner made no attempt to rationalize this distinction.
78. Id.
79. State v. Jalette, 119 R.I. 614, 382 A.2d 526 (1978).
80. Id.
81. Id. at 627, 382 A.2d at 533.
82. The Jalette court cited Commonwealth v. Boulden, which noted that because "sex
offenders are no more likely to repeat than other offenders ... there is no more reason to
admit prior offenses to show depravity or propensity in a sex case than in any other case."
Id. at 626, 382 A.2d at 533 (quoting from Commonwealth v. Boulden, 179 Pa. Super. 328,
344, 116 A.2d 867, 874 (Super Ct. 1978)).
83. Jalette, 119 R.I. at 614, 382 A.2d at 533 ("[Elvidence of other sexual behavior is, by
its very nature, uniquely apt to arouse the jury's hostility.").
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case of People v. Kelley.84 The Kelley court determined that evi-
dence of other nonremote sexual crimes against the prosecutrix
was admissible to show the accused's lewd disposition or intent to-
ward the prosecutrix, whereas such evidence regarding third per-
sons was subject to the traditional exceptions. Where the defen-
dant's intent was at issue, however, the other sexual offense
evidence was admissible only if absolutely necessary.8 ' In Jalette,
the Supreme Court of Rhode Island adopted this rule, but modi-
fied it by noting that other sexual crimes evidence "should be spar-
ingly used by the prosecution and only when reasonably neces-
sary." 6 Apparently, the Jalette court restricted the introduction of
evidence of other crimes against the prosecutrix by requiring that
the evidence be admitted only when reasonably necessary; but,
conversely, the court broadened the introduction of evidence of
other crimes against third parties when intent was at issue, by ad-
mitting such evidence where reasonably necessary.'7 In State v.
Pignolet," the supreme court acknowledged Jalette's expansion of
the introduction of other crimes evidence against third parties.89
Pignolet, however, further expanded the Jalette rule. In its discus-
sion of the exceptions to the rule barring propensity evidence, the
Pignolet court cited a 1935 Supreme Court of Rhode Island opin-
ion, which noted that evidence of prior bad acts was admissible if
"'interwoven with-the offense for which the defendant [was] tried.
•. ., ,,1 The Pignolet court used this language to hold that the tes-
timony of a sister of the victim of sexual abuse was admissible in
an action against the stepfather where the "[sister]'s testimony in-
dicate[d] that defendant's conduct toward [the victim] was not a
series of isolated incidents but instead was part of an ongoing pat-
tern of behavior that defendant exhibited toward both of his young
stepdaughters."' 1 The Pignolet court's misguided use of the "inter-
woven" language effectively discarded the Jalette court's require-
ment that prior bad acts of the defendant against third parties be
84. 66 Cal. 2d 232, 424 P.2d 947, 57 Cal. Rptr. 363 (1973). For a discussion of California
case law, see supra notes 49-65 and accompanying text.
85. 66 Cal. 2d at 240-43, 424 P.2d at 954-56, 57 Cal. Rptr. at 370-73.
86. Jalette, 119 R.I. at 627, 382 A.2d at 533.
87. As opposed to absolutely necessary.
88. - R.I. - 465 A.2d 176 (1983).
89. Id. at -, 465 A.2d at 180 ("We stated that rather than show absolute necessity
for such material, evidence of this type 'should be used sparingly and only when reasonably
necessary .... '"). Id.




admitted into evidence pursuant to the traditional exceptions. The
"interwoven" language used by the 1935 supreme court, notwith-
standing Pignolet's implication, did not create a unique exception
to the propensity rule, but was merely a poorly worded statement
of the traditional exceptions to the other crimes evidence rule.'3
Because the Pignolet court failed to articulate an actual issue for
which the other crimes of the stepfather were relevant, the intro-
duction of the other crimes was merely propensity evidence."
Although it purported to follow Jalette, the Pignolet court es-
poused a new rule with respect to evidence of other crimes of the
defendant committed against a child other than the prosecutrix:
such evidence was admissible when the uncharged conduct was
"closely related in time, place, age, family relationships of the vic-
tims, and the form of the sexual acts.""
D. Florida
Florida is another jurisdiction which has struggled to reconcile
the inconsistencies inherent in adopting an exception to the rule
92. The Colangelo court articulated its "interwoven" exception as follows: "Any cir-
cumstance that is incidental to or connected with the offense under investigation in such a
way that it tends to establish guilty knowledge, intent, motive, design, plan, scheme, system,
or the like, is proper evidence according to the overwhelming weight of authority." 55 R.I. at
174, 179 A. at 149.
93. In support of this, the Pignolet court commented: "Both later incidents, coupled
with defendant's first assault attempt, are relevant, material, and highly probative of defen-
dant's lecherous conduct toward these young girls ... ." Pignolet, - R.I. at - , 465
A.2d at 182.
Furthermore, even if there existed an element of the prosecution's case which war-
ranted the use of the other crimes evidence, the Pignolet court failed to apply correctly the
Jalette test of admissibility. Justice Kelleher and Chief Justice Bevilacqua, dissenting in
Pignolet, noted that "at no time did the trial justice give any consideration to the necessity
for presenting [the sister]'s testomony." Id. at _ 465 A.2d at 185 (Bevilacqua, C.J., Kel-
leher, J., dissenting).
Finally, even if the trial court did consider the necessity of the other crimes testimony,
the supreme court's standard of review (or absence thereof) rendered the Jalette precondi-
tion to admissibility useless. The Pignolet court determined that the trial court made the
Jalette inquiry into the necessity of the other crimes testimony because (a) "[tlhe prosecu-
tor represented to the court that she believed the evidence of the sister was necessary to
meet the state's burden of proof," and (b) if the defendant would have testified, the sister's
testimony would have been admissible on rebuttal. d. at _ 465 A.2d at 182. If the prose-
cutor merely has to claim that the other crimes evidence is necessary, or if the court is
permitted to conjure up hypothetical situations which would allow the admission of other
crimes evidence, then the Jalette requirement of necessity is without substance.
94. The Pignolet rule appears to be limited to sex offenses committed against children.
See State v. Bernier, - R.I. -, 491 A.2d 1000 (1985); State v. Cardoza, - R.I...
465 A.2d 200 (1983).
95. PignoLet, - R.I. at -' 465 A.2d at 181.
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barring propensity evidence. Williams v. State," decided in 1959,
is the seminal case on point. In Williams, a prosecution for rape,
the defendant hid in the prosecutrix's parked car, forced her to
drive to a secluded area and raped her. The prosecution, in order
to rebut the defendant's statement to the police that he had mis-
taken the victim's car for that of his brother's,"7 sought to intro-
duce evidence of an incident occurring approximately six weeks
before the attack on the prosecutrix. The evidence consisted of tes-
timony by a woman and a police officer that at the same parking
lot, the woman noticed the defendant in the back seat of her car as
she approached. She screamed and caught the attention of the tes-
tifying police officer. The defendant claimed that, having mistaken
the woman's car for that of his brother's, he crawled in the back to
take a nap. The woman's car was a black Plymouth whereas the
victim's car was a green Buick.98
In Williams, the Supreme Court of Florida, faced with the
question of what circumstances allow "similar fact evidence which
tends to reveal the commission of a collateral crime, ' '" sought to
establish the general proposition from which such analysis must
begin: "The test of admissibility is relevancy." 100 The court noted
that the arguments advanced for excluding other crimes evi-
dence-undue prejudice, collateral issues and immateriality-"dis-
regard[ed] the basic principle of the admissibility of all relevant
evidence having probative value in establishing a material is-
sue."101 The Williams court further stated "that relevant evidence
will not be excluded merely because it relates to similar facts
which point to the commission of a separate crime."103
After surveying prior case law in Florida, the Williams court
upheld the admission of the woman's testimony regarding the prior
incident. 10 3 The court held the evidence admissible as relevant to
establishing a plan, scheme or design, to meet the anticipated de-
fense of consent, to identify the accused, and to establish a general
pattern of criminality.104 In so holding, the court fell prey to what
has befallen most of the courts which have established an excep-
96. 110 So. 2d 654 (Fl. 1959).
97. At trial, the defendant denied making this statement. Id. at 657.
98. d. at 657-58
99. Id. at 658.
100. Id. at 660.
101. Id. at 658.
102. Id. at 659.




tion to the rule barring propensity evidence. Although purporting
to allow only evidence tending to establish a material issue, the
court nevertheless allowed evidence which tended to establish is-
sues not in dispute. Plan, scheme, or design, and general pattern of
criminality are not issues in a sexual battery charge, 05 and identity
was not an issue in Williams because the defendant admitted com-
mitting the act, but claimed that the prosecutrix consented.1e6 Fur-
thermore, although lack of consent was an issue in Williams, intro-
duction of other crimes committed against a victim other than the
prosecutrix to prove lack of consent is relevant only because it
shows the defendant's propensity to commit such crimes.es
On the other hand, the court's affirmance in Williams of the
admissibility of the other crimes evidence may not have been erro-
neous. Because the defendant initially claimed to be mistaken
about whose car he was climbing into, the other crimes testimony
may have been relevant to establishing the defendant's lack of mis-
take.oa The sweeping language of the Williams opinion, however,
has predictably led to confusion in Florida with respect to the ap-
propriate evidentiary rule and its application in the area of other
sexual crimes.10'
105. See Coler v. State, 418 So. 2d 238-39 (Fla. 1982) ("State of mind is not a material
fact in a sexual battery charge, nor is intent an issue."), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1127 (1983).
106. Williams, 110 So. 2d at 656.
107. E. IMWINKELRIED, supra note 17, at § 6.03.
108. Because the defendant later denied making the statement and changed his defense
to consent, the issue may have been irrelevant. See also Cotita v. State, 381 So. 2d 1146,
1147 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980) (The court misstated the exception to the rule barring propensity
evidence by noting that evidence of other crimes is relevant to establish "a pattern of crimi-
nality," but the evidence of the other crimes was admissible to show the bias of the defen-
dant's mother, where the defendant's mother sought to negotiate with the mother of the
victim to withhold charges against her son.) Id. at 1153 (Booth, J., dissenting).
109. See, e.g., Potts v. State, 427 So. 2d 822, 824 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983) ("Evidence of
these past acts had 'identifiable points of similarity' and a 'level of uniqueness' sufficient to
qualify as similar fact evidence."); Hodge v. State, 419 So. 2d 346 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983):
The testimony concerning [a victim other than the prosecutrix] was clearly ad-
missible under the line of decisions which has permitted similar fact testimony
for the purpose of showing 'a pattern of criminality' ... . In presenting its case
in chief, the state could not run the risk of assuming that the lack of consent
would not be an issue. Therefore, because [the victim other than the prosecu-
trix]'s testimony was relevant to an issue in the case, it was properly admitted
even if it had the incidental effect of blackening [the defendant's] character in
the eyes of the jury.
Id. at 347; Espey v. State, 407 So. 2d 300, 301 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981) ("To us, all this certainly
is relevant to demonstrate a unique common scheme or plan to systematically ravage and
deflower the helpless young members of his own household."); Gibbs v. State, 394 So. 2d
231, 232 (Fla. 1st. DCA) ("The existence of a lustful attitude towards his stepdaughter,
proven by prior sexual assaults, makes it more likely or probable that appellant possessed a
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The sprinkling of case law discussed above attests to the diffi-
culties of maintaining an exception in sexual crime cases to the
rule barring propensity evidence. Each jurisdiction has proven its
inability to consistently articulate and apply its own version of the
sexual crime exception.110 This is not surprising given that, gener-
ally speaking, sexual crime exceptions are in complete derogation
of the rule barring propensity evidence.' One solution is to de-
velop a scheme which provides for admission of evidence of other
sexual offenses for a purpose other than to prove the defendant's
propensity to commit sexual crimes, in addition to the purposes
traditionally recognized, such as intent or identity. The evidence
will thus fit neatly within the confines of the rule barring propen-
sity evidence, thereby eliminating the confusion with respect to the
admissibility of prior sexual offenses.
IV. CORPUS DELICTI
A. Other Crimes Evidence to Prove the Corpus Delicti
The scheme alluded to above entails the use of other sexual
crimes to prove the corpus delicti. Literally, the term corpus
similar state of mind toward his stepdaughter on the date of the alleged offense. This is
relevancy beyond mere propensity."), affd, 406 So. 2d 1113 (1981); Summit v. State, 285 So.
2d 670 (Fla. 3d DCA 1973) ("Turning to the case sub judice, we find the testimony of the
victim and her sister regarding prior similar conduct on the part of the defendant with them
to show the character of the deed as to motive and intent to be relevant and admissible.");
Gossett v. State, 191 So. 2d 281, 283 (Fla. 2d DCA 1966) ("We conclude that the trial judge
had authority.., to permit the evidence of former acts of the two defendants in connection
with the children involved in the instant case to show a pattern of criminality that makes
the prior crimes relevant to the commission of the acts in question.").
For a series of Florida cases that correctly apply the other crimes evidence rule, see Sias
v. State, 416 So. 2d 1213, 1215 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982):
Where the identity of the defendant was at issue, the court, in discussing evi-
dence of prior crimes, noted "that there be something so unique or particularly
unusual about the perpetrator or his modus operandi that it would tend to es-
tablish, independently of an identification of him by the collateral crime victim,
that he committed the crime charged.
Id. at 1215; Drake v. State, 400 So. 2d 1217, 1219 (Fla. 1981) ("The material issue to be
resolved by the similar facts evidence in the present case is identity, which the state sought
to prove by showing [defendant's] mode of operating."), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 2361 (1984);
Duncan v. State, 291 So. 2d 241, 243 (Fla. 2d DCA 1974) ("To begin with, neither a 'contin-
uing course of conduct,' 'plan or scheme' nor 'modus operandi' is an end in and of itself
which may be proved in a criminal case. If they were, then by whatever reason therefore so
would propensity be admissible.").
110. Terms such as "lewd disposition" and "sexual aberration" are simply euphemisms
for evidence which exhibits the defendant's propensity to commit sexual crimes. See supra




delicti means the body of the crime.11 2 According to Wigmore,
every crime includes three concepts: (1) the occurrence of a specific
kind of injury or social loss, (2) someone's criminality as the source
of the social loss, and (3) the accused's identity as the culpable
party." The corpus delicti encompasses both the notion of the
occurrence of injury or social loss and the notion that the injury or
loss was occasioned by someone's criminality."
Although many courts are reluctant to admit other crimes evi-
dence to prove the corpus delicti,"' a growing number of authori-
ties are questioning the soundness of this reluctance." 6 Moreover,
a number of cases have allowed other crimes evidence to prove the
corpus delicti.
1 7
United States v. Woods" ' is the seminal case permitting the
use of other crimes evidence to prove the corpus delicti. In Woods,
the defendant was convicted for the first degree murder of her
eight-month-old preadoptive foster son, who allegedly died from
smothering.11' During the trial, the court admitted the following
evidence. Beginning in 1945, while in the custody or control of the
defendant, nine children suffered a minimum of twenty episodes of
cyanosis.120 Of the nine children, seven died and five sustained
multiple episodes of cyanosis.121
On appeal, the Woods court found the other instances of cya-
nosis particularly relevant to the infant's death. " The court deter-
112. 1 UNDERHILL'S CRIMINAL EVIDENCE § 35, at 62 (6th ed. 1973).
113. 7 J. WIGMORE, supra note 39, § 2072, at 524.
114. Id.
115. K INWINKELRIED, supra note 17, J 4.01, at 4-2; 22 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra
note 24, § 5236, at 460. Comment, Evidence-Other Crimes-Balancing Relevance and
Need Against Unfair Unexplained Deaths as Proof of the Corpus Delicti, 6 RuT.-CM. LJ.
173, 179 (1974).
116. E. INWINKELRIED, supra note 17, § 4.01, at 4-3; Stone, supra note 14, at 1018; Com-
ment, supra note 115, at 179-82. But see Roth, Understanding Admissibility of Prior Bad
Acts: A Diagrammatic Approach, 9 IPPERDINz L. REV. 297, 308 n.40 (1982). ("Note that
prior acts of the defendant can never be used to establish the occurrence of the actus reus
itself.")
117. See, e.g., United States v. Woods, 484 F.2d 127 (4th Cir. 1973); People v. Maler, 23
Cal. App. 3d 973, 100 Cal. Rptr. 650 (Ct. App. 1972); People v. Lisenba, 14 Cal. 2d 403, 94
P.2d 569 (1939); State v. Schleigh, 210 Or. 155, 310 P.2d 341 (1957); People v. McClard, 81
Or. 510, 160 P. 130 (1916).
118. 484 F.2d 127 (4th Cir. 1973).
119. Id. at 128.
120. Id. at 130. Cyanosis, a blue color which occurs around the lips, arises from a lack
of oxygen. Id. at 129.
121. Id. at 130.
122. Id. at 133.
Thus, with regard to no single child was there any legally sufficient proof that
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mined that, although the evidence may have been admissible
under the accident and modus operandi exceptions,1'3 it preferred
to rest its decision on "broader" grounds, rejecting the opportunity
to mechanically fit the other crimes evidence into a recognized ex-
ception.1 24 The court held that the other crimes evidence was ad-
missible to prove the corpus delicti of murder. 1'
In support of its finding, the Woods court distinguished an
earlier case, State v. Donaluzzi,25 which stood for the proposition
that other crimes evidence was not admissible to prove the corpus
delicti.1" The court found Donaluzzi inapposite because
"Donaluzzi may be read to mean only that the exclusive use of
prior acts, without more, cannot establish the corpus delicti."1 8 It
determined that the prosecution's expert witness, who testified
that he was seventy-five percent certain that the victim died of
defendant had done any act which the law forbids. Only when all of the evidence
concerning the nine other children and (the victim] is considered collectively is
the conclusion that some or all of the other children died at the handa of the
defendant. We think also that when the crime is one of infanticide or child
abuse, evidence of repeated incidents is especially relevant because it may be the
only evidence to prove the crime.
Id.
123. Id.,at 133-34.
124. Id. at 134. The court recognized the difficulties of applying the accident and mo-
due operandi exceptions to the facts of Woods. Id. With respect to the accident exception,
the court noted that it is ordinarily "invoked only where an accused admits that he did the
acts charged but denies the intent necessary to constitute a crime, or contends that he did
the acts accidentally." Id. With respect to the modus operandi exception (dubbed the hand-
iwork or signature exception in Woods), the court rejected the defendant's argument "that
cyanosis among infants is too common to constitute an unusual and distinctive device unerr-
ingly pointing to guilt on her part [noting- that this argument] would not be without force,
were it not for the fact that so many children at defendant's mercy experienced this condi-
tion." Id. For a critical analysis of this portion of the Woods holding, see Note, Evidence-
Proof of Prior Events Admissible Generally and Specifically to Demonstrate Corpus
Delicti Because the Relevance of and the Need for the Evidence Outweighed its Prejudi-
cial Effect, 52 Tax L Rav. 585, 586-87 (1974).
125. Arguably, the language of the opinion implies that other crimes evidence is not
sufficient without independent proof of the corpus delecti. The court may have considered
as independent evidence the expert testimony introduced by the prosecution that there ex-
isted a 75% certainty that the victim's death resulted from homicide by smothering. Woods,
484 F.2d at 130. One authority has questioned the soundness of the independent evidence
requirement in Woods. See Comment, supra note 116, at 182-83 (The possible imposition of
a requirement of independent evidence in Woods is ill-advised.). But see E IuwINicm.
supra note 17, § 4.03, at 4.13 (The existence of the pathologist's testimony was critical.);
infro text accompanying notes 133-40.
128. 94 Vt. 142, 109 A. 57 (1920). Donaluzzi involved the illegal sale of intoxicating
liquor. Id. at 144, 109 A. at 58.
127. Woods, 484 F.2d at 135.
128. Id. For a discussion of whether the Woods holding encompassed the requirement
of independent evidence to prove the corpus delicti, see supra note 125.
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homicidal smothering, was sufficient independent proof of the
corpus delicti to permit admission of the other crimes evidence.2'
The court distinguished the remaining authorities supporting the
proposition that other crimes evidence was inadmissible to prove
the corpus delicti by noting that those cases involved situations
"in which there was a total lack of any evidence of corpus delicti,
or mere dictum that corpus delicti might not be proved by evi-
dence of prior acts.'
3 0 -
The Woods court drew support from confession cases and ar-
son cases in which courts have allowed evidence of prior crimes to
prove the corpus delicti.'3' Finding no reason to distinguish the
confession and arson cases, the court determined that sufficient au-
thority existed to find the other crimes evidence admissible to
prove the corpus delicti of murder.1
3 2
The cases which expressly maintain that other crimes evidence
is not admissible to prove the corpus delicti may be inapplicable
for a more compelling reason than that articulated by the Woods
court. Those cases were decided in jurisdictions which do not sub-
129. Woods, 484 F.2d at 135.
130. Id. Several reasons have been articulated to explain the tendency of courts to dis-
allow other crimes evidence to prove the corpus delecti. One may be the simple fact that the
issue of whether the crime occurred rarely arises. Comment, supra note 115, at 179. On the
other hand, the historical development of the notion of corpus delicti may shed light on the
traditional aversity to other crimes evidence as proof of the corpus delecti. Four English
cases dramatically influenced the concept of corpus delicti. In each of these cases, the de-
fendants were convicted of murder, some of them were hung, yet the alleged victim subse-
quently reappeared. Id. at 179-80 n.35.
131. Woods, 484 F.2d at 136.
132. At least one author has criticized the appropriateness of the confession and arson
analogies. See generally Note Evidence-Evidence of Prior Similar Incidents is Admissible
to Show the Corpus Delicti of Murder, 43 Cm. L. REv. 437 (1974). The author noted that
the confession cases may not be appropriate given the rationale of the requirement of cor-
roborating evidence. "The rationale behind the requirement of substantial independent cor-
roborating proof is the court's reluctance to convict a defendant solely on his own word
without being able to ascertain its trustworthiness." Id. at 442.
Furthermore the author determined the arson cases were decided pursuant to recog-
nized exceptions to the rule barring propensity evidence, such as the common plan or
scheme exception. Id. at 442-43. This distinction, however, is not convincing. The courts in
several of the arson cases mechanically applied the traditional exceptions, so that the opin-
ions purport to appropriately admit evidence of other crimes under a traditional exception,
but in fact admit the evidence solely to prove the corpus delicti. See, e.g., State v. Smith,
221 S.W.2d 158 (Mo. 1949) (The court held prior arson crimes admissible to prove intent yet
defendant's intent was not at issue.); State v. Schleigh, 210 Or. 155, 310 P.2d 341 (1957)
(The court held prior arson crimes admissible to prove motive yet the defendant's motive
was not at issue.). Additionally, even if it were true that the arson cases are not authority
for the proposition that other crimes evidence is admissible to prove the corpus delicti, the
author gave no explanation for disallowing other crimes to prove the corpus delicti.
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scribe to Wigmore's definition of corpus deliciti. In those jurisdic-
tions, the corpus delicti includes only the notion of social loss or
injury and does not include the notion that the loss or injury was
occasioned by someone's criminality.'" Where the corpus delicti is
restricted to this narrower definition, exclusion of other crimes evi-
dence may be defensible.
In those jurisdictions, other crimes evidence may not be intro-
duced to prove that there has been a loss or injury occasioned on
the alleged victim. Theoretically, ignoring for a moment the vic-
tim's testimony, '" other crimes evidence admitted to prove solely
loss or injury is inappropriate because the complete lack of evi-
dence of the charged crime renders any discussion of the probative
value of other crimes evidence wholly speculative.'a5
Moreover, in these jurisdictions which define corpus delicti
narrowly, in order to convict a defendant, the jury must draw the
inference that he is guilty of the charged crime solely from the de-
fendant's past misconduct, without tangible proof of any elements
of the crime.1' e This inference constitutes the forbidden use of
prior crimes as proof of the defendant's propensity to commit such
crimes. 38 7 Most importantly, to convict a defendant with no tangi-
ble evidence of the loss or injury, except the victim's testimony,
defies one's sense of justice.
Conversely, in those jurisdictions which describe the corpus
delicti as including both the loss or injury and someone's criminal-
ity,lu the categorical exclusion of other crimes to prove the corpus
delicti cannot be justified.' e Where the problem lies in the ambi-
133. K IuwiNKCmALR, supra note 17, § 4.01, at 4-2. Comment, supro note 115, at 180-
81.
134. The inability of the victim to testify is not a theoretical proposition in some child
sexual offense cases. The child may be held incomptetent to testify because of her immatur-
ity. See Comment, infro p. 245 (The Competency Requirement for the Child Victim of
Sexual Abuse: Must We Abandon It?, 40 U. Miami L. Rev. 245 (1985)).
135. See Trautman, supra note 37, at 388 ("Thus Fact A [the other crimes evidence]
will be said to be relevant to Fact B [the charged crime) when, according to human experi-
ence, it is so related to Fact B that Fact A, considered either by itself or in connection with
other facts renders probable the past, present or future existence or nonexistence of Fact
B."). If the circumstances of the charged crime are unknown, the preceding relevancy analy-
sis is impossible to undertake. The problem of relevancy, however, usually does not arise
where the alleged crime is a sexual offense because, at the very least, the victim will testify
as to the alleged crime.
136. Comment, supra note 116, at 180-81.
137. Id. at 181 n.38.
138. The majority of jurisdictions maintain Wigmore's definition of corpus delicti. J.
Wtouoax, supra note 39, § 2072, at 525.
139. K IMWINKnmEID, supra note 17, § 6.04, at 6-7; Comment, supra, note 115, at 181-
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guity of the cause of the loss, and there exists proof of the loss or
injury, there is no compelling reason why a court should not admit
other crimes evidence. The same notion is found in the traditional
exceptions: other crimes evidence is admissible to resolve ambigu-
ity regarding the defendant's state of mind or identity, but not to
prove the propensity of the defendant to commit the charged
crime.'
40
B. Other Sexual Crimes to Prove the Corpus Delicti of the
Child Sexual Offense
This Comment argues that where the corpus delicti is at issue
in a sexual offense trial, the prosecution should be able to intro-
duce other sexual offense evidence to prove the corpus delicti, pro-
vided the prosecution also proffers independent evidence of the
loss or injury, and the other crimes evidence meets certain rele-
vancy requirements. 1 4 In a nutshell, in order for other crimes evi-
dence to be admissible to prove the corpus delicti of a sexual of-
fense, the following requirements must be met:
1) There must be independent proof of the loss or injury;
2) The prior crime and the charged crime must be similar;
3) The defendant must have control over the victim;
4) The corpus delicti must be at issue.
When other crimes evidence is admitted under these condi-
tions, the rule barring propensity evidence will not be violated.
1. INDEPENDENT PROOF OF THE LOSS OR INJURY
In Woods, as in most cases admitting other crimes evidence to
prove the corpus delicti, the loss or injury was not at issue, primar-
ily because it was res ipsa loquitur the burnt building proves a
fire, the corpse proves a death. Thus, independent proof of the loss
usually exists, which is required when other crimes evidence is of-
fered to prove the corpus delicti.142 Similarly, in order for prior
82.
140. Comment, supra note 115, at 182. Cf. Note, Evidence-Proof of Particular
Facts-Evidence that Defendant May Have Committed Similar Crimes is Admissible to
Prove Corpus Delicti of Murder, 87 HAsv. L. Rzv. 1074, 1080 (1974) ("But although each
prior occurrence in Woods, taken individually, would not provide sufficient proof that [the
infant]'s death resulted from homicide, a cumulative inference of human design from a se-
ries of arguably natural deaths is not inherently weaker than an inference from similar facts
would be about the defendant's state of mind or identity.").
141. See infra notes 146-55 and accompanying text.
142. For a discusison of the necessity of independent proof of the corpus delicit, see
supra notes 133-40 and accompanying text.
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child sexual offense evidence to be admissible to prove the corpus
delicti, there must be independent evidence of the loss or injury,
and the other sexual crimes evidence must be proffered to prove
the second element of the corpus delicti-the fact of criminality.1 '
Evidence of other sexual offenses should generally be limited
to sexual offenses committed against children, because of the re-
quirement of independent proof of the loss or injury. 144 Although
proof of loss of virginity of an adult female does not make out a
prima facie case of rape because the woman may have consented to
the sexual act, or may have engaged in sex prior to the alleged
offense, proof that a child is no longer a virgin is strong evidence of
a loss or injury to the child because, generally, it is a crime to have
sex with a child. ' In other words, physical evidence found on the
body of a child which points to sexual activity constitutes the req-
uisite independent evidence of the social loss or injury.
2. SIMILARITY OF THE PRIOR CRIME AND THE CHARGED CRIME
A second criteria required by most courts that have allowed
other crimes evidence to prove the corpus delicti is similarity be-
tween the other crimes and the charged crime.' In Woods, almost
all of the children, including the victim, experienced cyanosis, yet
were seemingly healthy. Most of the medical examiner's explana-
tions contained in the autopsies were later proven to be logically
impossible or highly unlikely."17 Requiring a high degree of similar-
ity insures the relevance of the uncharged act to the charged act.
The more similar the prior sexual act is to the charged sexual act,
the more relevant the prior sexual acts evidence is likely to be.'
143. For a discussion of the elements of the corpus deUcti, see supra notes 112-14 and
accompanying text.
144. Another justification limiting the rule to child sexual crimes is the greater neces-
sity for evidence corroborating a child's testimony regarding the alleged crime. See 22 C.
WmoIH & K. GRAHAM, supra note 24, § 5236, at 462.
145. In most jurisdictions it is a crime to have sexual intercourse with a female not of
age. See, e.g., CAL PENAL. CODE § 261.5 (West 1985); FL& STAT. ANN. § 794.05 (West 1976);
N.Y. PENAL CODE § 130.35 (McKinney 1975). In this context the independent proof of the
loss or injury cannot be the testimony of the prosecutrix. Otherwise, the requirement of
independent evidence would be illusory because the victim will almost always testify to the
existence of a crime.
146. . lwtscm.amD, supra note 17, § 4.03, at 4-12.
147. Woods, 484 F.2d at 130-32.




Another aspect of the cases allowing other crimes evidence to
prove the corpus delicti is the notion of the defendant's control.'
4'
In Woods, the victims were in the custody or control of the defen-
dant.1 0 The control requirement is important because it ensures
the existence of an objective intermediate inference."'1 Where the
defendant can be connected with a number of similar incidents,
the inference of the defendant's perpetration of the charged crime
from his prior acts does not violate the other crimes evidence
rule. 1"' In other words, the higher the number of prior sexual of-
fenses committed by the defendant in the custody or control of the
child, the more probable it is that the defendant commited the
charged sexual offense, or alternatively, the more improbable the
possibility that the child victim fabricated her testimony.1"'
4. Corpus Delicti AT ISSUE
The requirements of the independent evidence of the corpus
delicti, similarity between the other crimes and the alleged crime,
and the defendant's control, insure that the rule barring propen-
sity evidence will not be violated. Where these requirements are
met,"54 and the corpus delicti is at issue,"' the other sexual crimes
149. E. IMWINKBLRIED, supra note 17, § 4.03, at 4-12.
150. Woods, 484 F.2d at 130.
151. For a discussion of the permissible inferences pursuant to the other crimes evi-
dence rule, see supra text accompanying notes 17-23.
152. 22 C. WIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra note 24, § 5236, at 465.
153. See E. IMWINKRLRIED, supra note 17, § 4.01, at 4-4.
Although the objective improbability of fabrication inference looks dangerously like the
corroboration rationale used presently by a number of courts, the corroboration rationale,
standing alone, is less persuasive in terms of maintaining the integrity of the rule barring
propensity evidence. Particularly in child sexual offense cases, the existence of the corpus
delicti is frequently at issue. Thus, other crimes evidence to prove the corpus delicti fits
neatly within the framework allowing other crimes evidence to prove a purpose other than
propensity. On the other hand, the credibility of a witness is always at issue. Thus, a flat
corroboration theory will invariably allow evidence of other sexual crimes, thereby rendering
the rule barring propensity evidence superfluous.
154. Admittedly, the foregoing requirements greatly decrease the scope of the permissi-
ble use of other sexual crimes evidence to prove the corpus delicti. As will be seen in the
textual discussion that follows, these limitations, however, are absolutely necessary to the
integrity of the rule barring propensity evidence and the maintenance of a system which
insures that the defendant receives a fair trial. See infra notes 156-57 and accompanying
text.
155. The rule barring propensity evidence requires that the other crimes evidence must
be proffered to prove an actual issue in dispute other than the propensity of the defendant
to commit the charged crime. See supra text accompanying notes 17-23.
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are relevant to prove the likelihood of the occurrence of the alleged
act, irrespective of the defendant's peculiar propensities.
V. CONCLUSION
Sexual offenses, by their nature, are reprehensible. Just as rep-
rehensible, however, is the use of normal human reactions to sex-
ual offenses, especially against children, to force judges and jurors
away from the actual issues in dispute. The lewd disposition excep-
tion and its variations are a form of this manipulation. This Com-
ment has attempted to hone the normal reactions of horror and
disgust for aberrant sexual offenses against children by establish-
ing an avenue for the prosecution to introduce, under limited cir-
cumstances, evidence of prior sexual offenses of the defendant.
Where the prosecution possesses evidence of the defendant's prior
sexual offenses, and where the corpus delicti of the charged sexual
offense is at issue, the prosecution may introduce the evidence,
provided that the other sexual offenses are similar in kind, the de-
fendant is in a control relationship with the victim or victims, and
independent proof of the loss or injury of the charged crime exists.
The requirement of independent evidence will generally limit the
permissible other acts evidence to that of sexual offenses commit-
ted against children.
The extremely limited circumstances which allow the admis-
sion of other sexual crimes to prove corpus delicti is unavoidable.
The court-carved exceptions to the other crimes rule in sexual
crime prosecutions generally violate the rule barring propensity ev-
idence.' 6 Introduction of evidence of other sexual offenses to prove
the defendant's propensity to commit such offenses has threatened
the integrity of our judicial system and has led to conviction of the
innocent.
15 7
Under the analysis set out in this Comment, in the trial of
Daniel Lowell Coler,158 the prosecution's proffered evidence would
have fared as follows. The testimony concerning the cucumber in-
156. See supra text accompanying notes 35-36.
157. Cf. Howson, Child Sexual Abuse Cases: Dangerous Trends and Possible Solu-
tionh, 1985 Tz CHAMPION 6,6 ("[T]here exists a percentage of cases, however large or small,
in which allegations of child sexual abuse are made against an individual, which allegations
are unfounded."); The Youngest Witness: is there a 'witch hunt' mentality in sex-abuse
cases?, Newsweek, Feb. 18, 1985, at 72 ("The pendulum of enforcement, it seems, has swung
too far.")
158. For a discussion of the facts in that trial, see supra text and accompanying notes
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cident would not be admissible if no detectable injury remained on
the child, i.e., there was no independent proof of the injury, and
because the cumcumber incident was not similar in kind to the
charged crime of rape. The testimony concerning the defendant's
threat to his son and the son's sexual intercourse with his sister
would not be admissible because the offenses are not similar in
kind to the charged offense. The victim's testimony concerning the
defendant's sexual intercourse with her would be admissible be-
cause there was independent proof of the loss-the doctor's testi-
mony concerning Mary's injuries, the prior crimes and the charged
crime were similar in kind-rape, and the victim was in the cus-
tody of her father when the prior and charged incidents oc-
curred." 9 Limiting the types of allowable evidence will thus insure
that the jury learns only of the relevant evidence, and is precluded
from learning of any highly prejudicial and irrelevant evidence.
AMBER DONNER-FROELICH
159. Note, however, the evidence is still subject to scrutiny under FEI. R. EvID. 403.
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